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NOTES

The Depth of Endurance: A Critical Look at Prolonged
Solitary Confinement in Light of the
Constitution and a Call to Reform
Shannon H. Church'
2
"The degree ofcivilization in a society can bejudged by entering its prisons."

-Fyodor Dostoyevski
INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, solitary confinement has reemerged as a primary form of
punishment within the United States penal system.3 The use of punitive
segregation, or solitary confinement ("solitary"), refers to the practice of isolating
prisoners from the rest of the prison system, and from one another, in a closed cell
for around twenty-three hours a day. 4 While conditions vary nationwide, prisoners
held in "supermax" facilities-units designed exclusively for inmate isolation in the
form of solitary confinement-are generally deprived of many basic privileges
enjoyed by the rest of the prison population, such as visitation rights and contact
with family members, 5 access to reading materials and television,6 and even small
' Shannon Church is a 2015 dual-degree J.D./M.A. graduate of the University of Kentucky College
of Law and the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce.
2 THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 210 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
See SHARON SHALEV, MANHEIM CTR. FOR CRIMINOLOGY, A SOURCEBOOK ON SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT 2 (2008), available at http://solitaryconfinement.org/uploads/sourcebook web.pdf
("[T]owards the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st, the use of long term, large
scale solitary confinement returned in the form of 'supermax' (short for super-maximum security) and
'special security' prisons."); see also JOHN J. GIBBONS &NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, VERA INST.
OF
JUSTICE,
CONFRONTING
CONFINEMENT
14
(2006),
available
at
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/ConfrontingConfinement.pdf
("Between
1995 and 2000, the growth rate in the number of people housed in segregation far outpaced the growth
rate of the prison population overall: 40 percent compared to 28 percent.").
See Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A BrifHistory and
Review ofthe Literature, 34 CRIME &JUST. 441, 448 (2006) [hereinafter Smith, Solitary Confinement].
s See, e.g., Andrew Gumbel, How Did a Form of Torture Become Policy in America's Prison System?,
ALTERNET (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/how-did-form-torturebecome-policy-americas-prison-system ("[P]risoners had property confiscated ... and contact with the
outside world-particularly mail from their families-was restricted or cut off altogether."); see also
Billy Ball, What Life is Like in Solitary Confinement at North Carolina's Central Prison System, INDY
WEEK (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/what-life-is-like-in-solitary-confinement-
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relief in the form of natural light or time spent outdoors.' Originally conceived as
an infrequent and short-term form of punishment, the number of prisoners in
solitary confinement has risen substantially in recent years. "As of 2006, there were
at least fifty-seven supermax prisons in forty states that housed approximately
20,000 prisoners" at any given time.9 The Federal Bureau of Prisons has reported a
seventeen percent increase in its use of solitary confinement between 2008 and
2013.10 This disturbing increase in the practice is often attributed to the penal
system's commitment to "tough-on-crime" policies that were pervasive and
garnered substantial support in tandem with the "war on drugs" rhetoric in the
latter part of the twentieth century."
As the number of prisoners confined to solitary continues to grow, so does the
length of their sentences in isolation. In the Pelican Bay Security Housing Unit in
California, prisoners are held for an average of seven and a half years.' 2 Of the
prisoners in solitary confinement at Pelican Bay, more than half have been there for
at least five years." Eighty-nine have been there for at least twenty years, and one
inmate has been in solitary confinement for forty-two years. 14 Before being
shutdown in 2013 due to budgetary constraints, the Tamms Correctional Facility
in Illinois held an estimated twenty-five percent of its prisoners in continuous
solitary confinement for over ten years."s Furthermore, in many state systems and in
the federal system, some prisoners have effectively been sentenced to solitary
confinement for the rest of their lives." In Ohio, a group of prisoners held in the
supermax prison have been labeled by the state as "long-termers," a group of
at-north-carolinas-central-prison/Content?oid=3182175 (noting that inmates in solitary confinement at
North Carolina's Central Prison "have little contact with others . . . their visitation is limited. .. [and
they] may not use the telephone").
6 See SHALEV, supra note 3, at 19.
7 Id. at 9.
s Michael Montgomery, This is What Solitary Confinement Does to Your Face, POLITICO,
http://www.politico.com/magazine/gallery/2014/01/this-is-what-solitary-confinement-does-to-yourface/001562-022211.html#BOO.VZ2RVOuZ7jQ(last visited July 4, 2015).
'Jules Lobel, ProlongedSolitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115,
115 (2008).
'o Ron Stief, Time to Bring an End to Torture in Our Jails, HUFFINGTON POST (May. 5, 2014,
5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-ron-stief/time-to-bring-an-end-to-t-b_4899502.html.
" See, e.g., Dick Durbin, Reassessing Solitry Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and
Public Safety Consequences, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQ (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://nccdglobal.org/blog/reassessing-solitary-confinement-the-human-rights-fiscal-and-public-safetyconsequences (noting that supermax prisons were part of the "tough-on-crime policies that seemed to
make sense" in the 1980s).
12 Shane Bauer, No Way Out, MOTHER JONES, Nov.-Dec. 2012, at 22, 24, available at
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/10/solitary-confinement-shane-bauer.
13

Id.

14 Id.

" Amy Fettig, Tamms "Supermax"Prison, with Its Inhumane and Ridiculously Expensive Solitary
Confinement Practices, Is Officially a Thing of the Past!, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 4, 2013,
11:00 AM), https://www.adu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/tamms-supermax-prison-its-inhumane-andridiculously-expensive-solitary.
'Lobel, supra note 9, at 115.
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inmates who prison officials indefinitely plan to keep in solitary confinement for
twenty-three hours a day."
Ultimately, the punitive nature of solitary confinement raises Eighth
Amendment considerations, particularly whether prolonged or permanent solitary
isolation qualifies as cruel and unusual punishment in light of the well-documented
psychological effects it can cause.'" Additionally, the administration of solitary
confinement raises questions regarding the applicability of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment given that prisoners are often deprived of a variety
of due process procedural protections.19
Part I of this Note will briefly detail the history and current use of solitary
confinement in the United States' prison system and examine the conditions under
which it is applied. Part II of this Note will discuss the principles of the Eighth
Amendment as they apply to solitary confinement and argue that, in cases of
prolonged or permanent isolation, the practice violates the constitutional protection
from "cruel and unusual punishment." This portion will also look at recent solitary
reforms in the state of Mississippi and how these reforms brought the practice in
line with the Eighth Amendment. Part III will look at solitary in light of a further
constitutional protection: the right to due process provided under the Fourteenth
Amendment. This section will also analyze the state of Maine's recent solitary
reforms and how prisoners' rights to due process protections are fulfilled by such
structural changes. In light of the success of such institutional restructuring, Part
IV of this Note will propose federal reform guidelines based on the substantial
changes made in Mississippi and Maine, which would bring the practice of solitary
confinement within the rights proscribed by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments that safeguard prisoners from "cruel and unusual punishment" and
the deprivation of procedural due process.
I. THE ORIGINS OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
AND AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICE

One of the first experiments with solitary confinement as a form of punishment
occurred in the United States in the early nineteenth century at the Eastern State
Penitentiary-widely known as Cherry Hill Prison-in Philadelphia. 20 Prison
officials at Cherry Hill saw solitary confinement as a vehicle for the rehabilitation
of criminals through segregation, 2 1and the practice was viewed as an incentive for
Id. at 115-16.
" See generally Stuart Grassian, PsychiatricEffects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L.
POL'Y 325 (2006) (discussing the severe psychiatric harm caused by solitary confinement).
" See, e.g., Jean Casella &James Ridgeway, Inmates'Due Process Rights Routinely Suppressed in
California Prisons, SOLITARY WATCH (Aug. 3, 2010), http://solitarywatch.com/2010/08/03/inmatesdue-process-rights-routinely-suppressed-in-california-prisons.
20 Lobel, supra note 9, at 118.
21 See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle ofHell: An Eighth Amendment
Analysis of Imposing ProlongedSupermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a Mental Illness, 90
DENy. U. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (2012).
&
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isolated prisoners outfitted only with a Bible to "repent, pray and find
introspection"2 and eventually "return to society as a morally cleansed Christian
citizen."" However, many of the inmates in isolation at the Eastern State
Penitentiary fell victim to mental illness, committed suicide, or became unable to
function in society. 24 In 1842, author Charles Dickens condemned the practice of
solitary confinement after seeing the conditions at Cherry Hill, stating:
I believe that very few men are capable of estimating the immense amount of
torture and agony which this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, inflicts
upon the sufferers; and in guessing at it myself, and in reasoning from what I have
seen written upon their faces, and what to my certain knowledge they feel within, I
am only the more convinced that there is a depth of terrible endurance in it which
none but the sufferers themselves can fathom, and which no man has a right to
inflict upon his fellow-creature. I hold this slow and daily tampering with the
mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse than any torture of the body.25
Although many American prisons initially followed the form of Cherry Hill in
adopting solitary confinement as a method of punishment, most began to move
away from the practice within a few years of implementation due to the
psychological and even physical pain it inflicted.26 Ultimately, the use of solitary fell
out of favor in the American prison system and was deserted in the following
decades, especially in light of a majority condemnation of the practice in 1890 by
the Supreme Court.27 However, solitary reemerged as a widespread penalty to
manage prisoners in the 1980s in response to the "massive growth in prison
populations, the abandonment of rehabilitative efforts, and the adoption of
increasingly punitive ideologies and strategies,"28 and the practice has become
increasingly popular ever since.2 9 A New York Times article, published in 2012,
noted that:
At least 25,000 prisoners-and probably tens of thousands more, criminal
justice experts say-are still in solitary confinement in the United States. Some
remain there for weeks or months; others for years or even decades. More inmates
are held in solitary confinement here than in any other democratic nation . . . .0
22 See Laura Sullivan, Timeline: Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons, NPR (July 26, 2006, 7:52
PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyd=5579901.
23 PETER SCHARFF SMITH, WHEN THE INNOCENT ARE PUNISHED: THE CHILDREN OF
IMPRISONED PARENTS 22 (2014).
24 Sullivan, supra note 22.
25 CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 39 (1842).
26 Smith, Solitary Confinement, supra note 4, at 465-67.
27 See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890) (noting that "a considerable number" of the inmates
in solitary confinement units in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Maryland "fell, after even a short
confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and
others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better
were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any
subsequent service to the community").
28 SHARON SHALEV, SUPERMAX: CONTROLLING RISK THROUGH SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
296 (Taylor & Francis ed., 3d ed. 2011).
29 Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009, at 36, 42.
30 Erica Goode, Rethinking Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at Al.
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II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND SOLITARY

A. Why the ConstitutionApplies to Inmates Generally

.

In the seminal 1948 case Price v. Johnston, the Supreme Court held that
"[1]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system."3' The emphasis on many suggested that not all of a prisoner's rights
are limited or forfeited by virtue of his incarceration, and the Court later noted in
Wolff v. McDonnell that "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country," suggesting that prisoners, by virtue of
the fact that they remain citizens of the United States, are still granted the
protections of the Constitution, even if they are necessarily limited by the nature of
the prison system.32 More direct acknowledgment of constitutional protection came
in 1972 when the Court noted that:
Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to enforce the constitutional
rights of all "persons," including prisoners. We are not unmindful that prison
officials must be accorded latitude in the administration of prison affairs, and that
prisoners necessarily are subject to appropriate rules and regulations. But persons in
prison, like other individuals, have the right to petition the Government for redress
of grievances ....
Ultimately, the courts have long held that prisoners' constitutional rights are
tempered by their incarceration; however, prisoners, as citizens of the nation, still
fall within the ambit of the Constitution and therefore retain their constitutional
protections.
B. The Eighth Amendment and Prisoner'sRights
Given that prisoners still retain their constitutional rights while incarcerated, it
necessarily follows that they reserve the protection from "cruel and unusual
punishment" provided under the Eighth Amendment while serving their prison
sentences. 34 The courts have held that a prison official's action-for purposes of
this Note, the placement of the prisoner in solitary confinement-violates the
Eighth Amendment when two prongs are met. First, the allegedly unconstitutional
violation must be "objectively, sufficiently serious" so that it imposes a "substantial
risk of serious harm." 3 s Second, the prison official must have the requisite mens rea
of "deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety"3 6 that results in a denial of
a1 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
32 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
33 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusualpunishments inflicted.") (emphasis added).

s Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298
(1991)).
3 Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-303 (1991)).
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"the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities."1 7 The risk of harm must be
"unreasonable" in that the challenged condition (the practice of solitary
confinement) is "sure" or "very likely" to cause "serious" damage to the inmate's
future health, and the risk must be one that society considers "so grave that it
violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a
risk."" However, even when an action infringes a specific constitutional guarantee,
the courts have noted that it must be weighed against the fundamental objective of
prison administration: safeguarding institutional security."
C. Documented Violations of the Eighth Amendment Standard
Applying the above mentioned standards to the conditions of solitary
confinement, evidence suggests that a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights are
often breached given the negative mental effects induced by solitary confinement
that can qualify as a deprivation of "the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities," 4 0 and the fact that inmates are often confined in conditions that
impose "a substantial risk of serious harm" 41-most significantly, the risk of serious
mental harm. However, state and federal courts have noted that not all
psychological effects stemming from solitary confinement rise to the level of "cruel
and unusual punishment." In Madrid v. Gomez, the Northern District Court of
California noted that:
The Eighth Amendment simply does not guarantee that inmates will not suffer
some psychological effects from incarceration or segregation. However, if the
particular conditions of segregation being challenged are such that they inflict a
serious mental illness, greatly exacerbate mental illness, or deprive inmates of their
sanity, then [prison officials] have deprived inmates of a basic necessity of human
existence-indeed, they have crossed into the realm of psychological torture.42
One potent example that arguably violates the courts' stated interpretation of
activity that amounts to "cruel and unusual punishment" can be seen at the Pelican
Bay Security Housing Unit in California. Dr. Craig Haney, a leading authority on
the psychological effects of solitary confinement on prisoners, visited Pelican Bay
multiple times and conducted a study on the mental health effects solitary
confinement can provoke in inmates.43 One hundred randomly chosen inmates
were asked a series of twenty-seven questions "focused on symptoms of
psychological distress and the negative effects of prolonged social isolation,
including confused thought process, hallucinations, irrational anger, emotional
3

Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 36 (1993).

' Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979).
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
42 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
43 Craig Haney, "Infamous Punishment": The Psychological Consequences of Isolation, NAT'L
PRISON PROJECTJ., Spring 1993, at 3, availableathttp://www.abolishsolitary.com/uploads/1/8/9/1/18
915867/haney-infamous-punishmentnppjournal_8-2.pdf

'2014 -2015]

PROLONGED SOLITARY CONFINEMENT

645

flatness, violent fantasies, social withdrawal, oversensitivity to stimuli, and chronic
depression."" A majority of inmates in solitary reported some or all of these
symptoms.45 At the end of the study at Pelican Bay, Haney concluded that
long-term social deprivation in solitary units was "totally and completely
enforced."46 Some men were in isolation deprived of "human contact, touch and
affection for years on end"47 and many still were not privileged to visits from family
or friends for years. 48 The prison's mail system was so substandard that it took one
inmate over seven weeks to learn that his son had died.49
At Pelican Bay, an investigative reporter conceived of a project where he took
pictures of inmates in segregation and asked them to comment on the difference in
their appearances from photos before they were sent to prison, versus images of
themselves after decades in solitary. One prisoner reflected:
To describe the time passed between those photos. Well, you think odd
thoughts, scenes from a simpler, freer life - Things like chasing beautiful girls, and
getting up in the morning for work. Then the changes both in a mental and
physical way, I've grown older, then the weight of its reality breaks your heart and
the quest for sanity forces you to your knees, an anguish echoes in your soul, 'will I
die here'?so
Given that many psychological studies have noted the necessity of human
interaction for mental health and wellness, prolonged solitary confinement can be
said to violate the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" test articulated by
the courts. As Dr. Haney noted at the 2014 annual meeting of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science: "So much of who we are depends on
our contact with other people, the social context in which we function, and when
you remove people from that context, they begin to lose their very sense of self."s"
Essentially, human beings are social creatures. To deprive individuals of the
fundamental necessity of social interaction for prolonged periods of time certainly
violates the low threshold of a "minimum civilized measure" of "life's
necessities"-necessities humans require in order to maintain mental wellness and
stability and to retain the "sense of self"'52 that social contact breeds.
Furthermore, given that many studies have noted that social isolation is a
catalyst for mental illness, the "risk of substantial harm" component of the Eighth
Amendment test is also implicated in the conversation surrounding solitary
Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1234.
Id. at 1234 n.172.
' Haney, supra note 43, at 7.

4

45

47 Id. at 4.
48 Id.

49 Sally Mann Romano, If the SHU Fits: Cruel and Unusual Punishment at California'sPelican
Bay State Prison, 45 EMORY LJ. 1089, 1120 (1996) (citing a letter from inmate Daniel Sheets,
reprinted in 2 PELICAN BAY PRISON EXPRESS, No. 4, May 1994, at 20).
50 See Montgomery, supra note 8, at 19.
s Madyn Willigan, What Solitary Confinement Does to the Human Brain, SOLITARY WATCH
(Aug. 4, 2014), http://solitarywatch.com/2014/08/04/what-solitary-confinement-does-to-the-humanbrain.
52 Id.
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confinement.s" When prisoners are deprived of social interaction, studies indicate
that they become "profoundly lethargic in the face of their monotonous, empty
existence 54 and that the lethargy may "shade into despondency and, finally, to
clinical depression."ss Certainly regressing into clinical depression amounts to a
"substantial risk" to the prisoner's health and well-being, a risk prohibited by the
courts interpretation of the Eighth Amendment protections afforded to prisoners.
Further scientific studies have proven that social isolation in solitary
confinement damages the fundamental mechanics of the brain. In an article
published by Aeon magazine, reporter and researcher Shruti Ravindran amassed
recent scientific research to make the assertion that solitary confinement
"irrevocably harm[s] the brain."5 6 Ravindran used information from formerly
incarcerated persons and renowned neuroscientists who are devoted to
documenting the negative effects that prolonged isolation can have on a person's
psyche. Particularly, Ravindran cited psychiatrist Stuart Grassian's 1982 "Walpole
studies," which observed prisoners in solitary in a Massachusetts state prison.
Grassian ultimately concluded of inmates in solitary: "These people [are] very
sick."s" He decided that the mental health effects of solitary resembled "anoxic
brain injury-the result of an oxygen-starved brain."s These studies indicate that
prisoners in solitary face a "substantial risk of harm," the threshold articulated by
the courts for "cruel and unusual punishment," given that many prisoners devolve
into depression upon prolonged periods of isolation, and that many leading
researchers in the field deem the mental harm imposed by solitary "irrevocable.""
D. How Mississippi's Solitary Confinement Reforms Bring the
Practicein Line with the Eighth Amendment
Mississippi is one of several states that has undergone unregulated reforms
regarding the conditions of solitary confinement. Before the state's reforms,
conditions in Mississippi supermax prisons were bleak and arguably often violated
the Eighth Amendment given that prisoners were deprived of the basic necessity of
human contact for long periods of time in such a way that would likely cause
"substantial harm" in the form of mental degradation.o Willie Russell, an inmate in
solitary confinement in Mississippi, described the circumstances, noting that he
was housed in a "cell with a solid, unvented Plexiglas door. The cells were also
sewers, thanks to a design flaw in cellblock toilets that often flushed excrement
s" See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
54 Haney, supra note 43, at 6.
s Id.

Shruti
Ravindran,
Twighlight in
the Box,
AEON
http://aeon.co/magazine/society/what-solitary-confinement-does-to-the-brain.
56

57

(Feb.

27,

2014),

Id.

58 Id.
s' See id.
' See Jean Casella & James Ridgeway, The End of Mississippi's Notorious Supermax Unit,
SOLITARY WATCH (June 12, 2010), http://solitarywatch.com/2010/06/12/the-end-of-mississippisnotorious-supermax-unit.
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from one cell into the next. Prisoners were allowed outside-to pace or sit alone in
metal cages-just two or three times a week."'
In response to these deplorable conditions, the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") brought a lawsuit against the Commissioner of Mississippi's
Department of Corrections ("DOC") regarding the state's notorious supermax
facility at Parchman Prison, commonly known as "Unit 32."62 The ACLU alleged
that the conditions of solitary confinement in Unit 32 were "so barbaric, the
deprivation of medical and mental health care so extreme, and the defects in
security so severe, that the lives and health of the men confined there .

.

. [were] at

great and imminent risk."6 3 Furthermore, the ACLU noted in their complaint that
many prisoners were confined to Unit 32 because they were HIV-positive or had
other special medical needs or severe mental illnesses, and that the prisoners had to
confront conditions including "pervasive filth and stench; malfunctioning plumbing
and constant exposure to human excrement; lethal extremes of heat and humidity;
... grossly inadequate medical, mental health, and dental care;. . . and the constant
pandemonium, night and day, of severely mentally ill prisoners screaming, raving,
and hallucinating in nearby cells." 64
In response to the lawsuit, prison officials agreed to loosen restrictions on the
inmates in solitary confinement, particularly in the realm of social engagement.
The changes allowed inmates to spend multiple hours outside of their cells each
day. The prison also added a basketball court and communal dining area, and
implemented a system through which prisoners could work their way towards
greater privileges.6 s As a result, violence decreased, inmate behavior improved, and
the number of prisoners in solitary confinement decreased from more than 1000 to
about 300.66 The undisputed success of the reforms even swayed prison officials
during their fight against the ACLU's lawsuit. Christopher Epps, the
Commissioner of Mississippi's DOC against whom the original ACLU lawsuit
was brought, stated that he "started out believing that difficult inmates should be
locked down as tightly as possible, for as long as possible," but by the end of the
process, he realized that "[i]f you treat people like animals, that's exactly the way
they'll behave."'6 Ultimately, in 2010, Mississippi no longer required a supermax

61

John Buntin, Exodus: How America's Reddest State-andIts Most Notorious Prison-Became

a Model ofCorrections Reform., GOVERNING, Aug. 2010, at 20, 21.
6 See generally Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for an
Award of Attorneys' Fees, Expert Fees and Other Litigation Expenses, Presley v. Epps, No. 4:05-CV00148 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 8, 2011).
6 Complaint at 2, Presley, No. 4:05-CV-00148.
6 Id.
5 Goode, supra note 30.
6 Id.
67 Id.
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prison as a result of the reforms, and Unit 32 was "permanently shuttered,"'6 saving
the state over $5 million in the process. 6 9
The focal points of Mississippi's solitary confinement reforms were measures
including increased social interaction among prisoners and clear communication to
prisoners regarding their opportunities to remove themselves from isolation. As
Erica Goode's New York Times article details:
[B]y the end of six months, most prisoners were spending hours a day outside
their cells or had been moved to the general population of other prisons. A clothing
warehouse was turned into a group dining hall, and a maintenance room was
converted to an activities center. The basketball court filled with players.70
Mississippi's reforms indicate that all parties involved in the prison system
benefit when prisoners are removed from prolonged periods of isolation and are
given opportunities to engage socially. Beyond the benefit to the prisoners, and the
potential fiscal benefits to the state, increased social interaction removes much of
the need for an Eighth Amendment violation analysis. Because prospects for
increased social interaction embedded in the reforms ameliorate the detrimental
mental effects solitary can induce-that is, prisoners no longer anticipate being
locked up alone for twenty-three hours a day and can reengage socially-Unit 32's
administration of solitary confinement can no longer be said to "impose a
substantial risk to the inmate's health" that deprives a prisoner of one of "life's
necessities:" social interaction.
III. SOLITARY CONFINEMENT THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE: ISOLATION IN LIGHT OF

A. Due Process StandardsArticulated by the Courts
Distinct from the analysis of solitary confinement under the Eighth
Amendment's guarantee from "cruel and unusual punishment" is a separate
constitutional consideration: the protection of procedural due process guaranteed
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.n The Constitution
provides that state governments cannot abridge central liberty, life or property
rights of private citizens-often referred to as "interests"-without providing basic
procedural due process protections.72 Once an "interest" has been established, the
government must provide the procedural protections of due process before that
interest may be infringed."
" Margaret Winter, Mississippi: An Unlikely Model for Reforming Solitary Confinement, OPEN
SOC'Y FOUND. (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/mississippi-anunlikely-model-for-reforming-solitary-confinement.
6 Goode, supra note 30.

70 d

7 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (insuring that no State shall "deprive any person
of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
72
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-59 (3rd ed. 2009).

73

Id.
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A seminal case addressing the due process rights of prisoners is Wolff v.
McDonnell, in which the Supreme Court established minimum due process
requirements for prison disciplinary hearings.74 Later, in Sandin v. Conner, the
Supreme Court substantially limited the holding in Wolff by ruling that the
punishment of short-term solitary confinement does not violate the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.s In that case, the petitioner's punishment of
thirty days in isolation amounted to one of the "ordinary incidents of prison life"
and did not present the type of "atypical, significant deprivation in which a State
might conceivably create a liberty interest" that would be afforded due process
protections."6 The Court noted that, given the inherently restrictive nature of a
prison, some infringement upon an inmate's liberty is necessary to run the
institution effectively and to ensure the safety of the prison." In other words, to
prove that a form of punishment, such as solitary confinement, implicates a liberty
interest requiring due process protection, prisoners post-Sandin must show that the
treatment constituted an egregious, "atypical, significant deprivation" 71 -a
substantially higher threshold than that articulated by the WolffCourt. Applied to
the context of prison administration, courts have consistently stated that prisoners
retain only the most limited liberty interests, and courts are exceedingly deferential
to the decisions of prison administrators.7 9
In Koch v. Lewis,so Arizona inmate Mark Koch, a designated member of the
white supremacist prison gang the Aryan Brotherhood, was confined indefinitely to
solitary confinement in an Arizona state prison. Prison officials claimed that the
inmate's confinement was a necessity, as he had the option of being released from
solitary when he divulged his knowledge of gang culture within the institution to
prison officials. s However, when Koch complied, his affiliates in the Aryan
Brotherhood and members of other gangs would likely have retaliated against him
with violence.82 As such, the inmate's segregation from the rest of the prison
population was deemed necessary for his safety." In determining whether Koch
had a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the court relied on language in
Sandin to assess whether Koch's indefinite confinement qualified as an "atypical
and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."84
Ultimately, the court determined that Koch's indefinite detention constituted the
418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974).
s 515 U.S. 472, 473 (1995).

74

7

Id. at 472-73.

n Id. at 485.
7 Id. at 473.

71 See, e.g., Julia M. Glencer, Comment, An Atypical and Significant' Barrier to Prisoners'
ProceduralDue Process Claims Based on State-CreatedLiberty Interests, 100 DICK. L. REV. 861, 869
(1996) (noting that "judges deferred to the informed judgment of prison officials intimately versed in
the maintenance of a secure and effective prison").
s 216 F. Supp. 2d 994, 996-97 (D. Ariz. 2001).
81

Id. at 997.

82 Id. at 998.

8 Id. at 996-98.
' Id. at 999 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).
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sort of "extreme deprivation" that would give rise to a liberty interest.ss Once a
liberty interest was established, the court examined the procedural due process
protections attached to that interest. The court noted that, generally, inmates
designated for solitary confinement should receive "adequate notice, an opportunity
to be heard, and periodic review.""6 The court also noted that, in similar cases, the
Supreme Court has held that evidentiary protections apply-the evidence against
the inmate must support the decision to segregate him, and that evidence must be
somewhat reliable.8 7

In tandem with the procedural requirements established in Koch, the Supreme
Court has found that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment compels a
meaningfiil periodic review to ensure that administrative segregation is not a
"pretext for indefinite confinement."" Furthermore, in Austin v. Wilkinson, a
district court in Ohio held that procedural due process obligates prison officials to
inform inmates in their reviews what type of behavior or achievements would
render them eligible for removal from solitary confinement." Additionally, courts
have held that prisoners have a due process right to the be apprised of the reasons
for their placement in solitary confinement, which could serve as a "guide for future
behavior."90
B. Evidence ofDue Process Violations in Relation to Solitary Confinement
Given the massive number of prisoners in solitary confinement in the United
States and the particularities associated with individual prisons and their
administrative processes, it would be impossible to substantiate a sweeping claim
that all prisons deny every prisoner their due process rights where those rights are
warranted. However, evidence suggests that, in the absence of meaningful federal
guidelines, prisoners confined to solitary confinement nationwide are routinely
deprived of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process in a variety of ways.
While most prison systems have a formalized review process through which a
prisoner's confinement to solitary is examined on a regular basis to determine
whether they should be released (typically every thirty to ninety days), many
indications suggest that the review process is usually "pro forma, with prison staff
rubber-stamping decisions to renew terms of solitary confinement ad infinitum.""
Although these periodic reviews amount facially to minimal due process for

&

a Id. at 1007.
6 Id. at 1003.
87 Id.
" Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 497 n.9 (1983).
' Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-71, 2007 WL 2840352, at *6-7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 27,2007).
"o Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 226 (2005) (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal
Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979)).
9' Reassessing Solitaiy Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights ofthe S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 7 (2012) (statement of the Human Rights Def Ctr.), available at
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/publications/hrdc-congressional-comments-solitaryconfinement-june-2012.
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prisoners in segregation, in practice "there is no meaningful, independent review of
decisions to keep prisoners in solitary for years or even decades." 92 When such
decisions are challenged, courts typically defer to the "informed discretion of
corrections officials."`
As discussed above, when a prisoner is placed in solitary confinement, the
Supreme Court has held that prisoners so confined must be accorded meaningful
periodic review so that isolation does not serve as a "pretext for indefinite
confinement." 9 When a prisoner is placed in a supermax, the due process
requirement of meaningful periodic review requires that his or her behavior be
reevaluated at regular intervals to determine whether supermax confinement is still
warranted. Yet, a trend has emerged in supermax confinement in which prison
officials simply designate certain prisoners as long-term solitary inmates for
essentially a lifetime or prolonged sentence. " In such cases, the due process
requirement of periodic review becomes meaningless. While prison officials may
still go through the administrative motions of providing review, the decision is
predetermined, and the review is a sham. As one legislator laments: "Do we feel
comfortable putting a man or woman in a dark hole for decades on end with no
additional due process? Is this practice consistent with our values? I don't think so.
I know we are better than that.""6
Mounting evidence demonstrates that prisoners are routinely denied
meaningful review and deprived of information that outlines a "guide for future
behavior" 97 as well as information regarding the steps necessary to remove
themselves from solitary and the evidence against them. These deprivations,
standing alone and considered collectively, amount to a clear violation of the due
process requirements mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by
the courts.
C. Reforms in Maine - CorrectingDue Process Violations
Mississippi is not the only state to experience success by restructuring its
application of solitary confinement. Prior to reforms in 2010, solitary confinement
in Maine's State Prison involved isolation in an eighty-six square foot cell for
twenty-three hours each day during the week, and twenty-four hours a day on the
weekends." Prisoners did not have access to radios or televisions, medical and
92

Id.

&

9' Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
94 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 497 n.9 (1983).
9 See, e.g., Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-71 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2007), 2007 WL
2840352, at *6-7.
96 Rep. Richmond Introduces Bill to Reform Solitay Confinement, RICHMOND.HOUSE.GOV
(May 8, 2014), http://richmond.house.gov/press-release/rep-richmond-introduces-bill-reform-solitaryconfinement.
" Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 226 (2005) (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal
Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979)).
9' Reassessing Solitaiy Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on
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mental health screenings were infrequent and often conducted through a closed cell
door, and human interaction was restricted to brief communications with
correction staff.99 Prisoners could be confined to solitary as punishment for a
wide-ranging variety of infractions, from physical altercations with other inmates to
0
In terms of the right to due process,
moving too slowly in the lunch line.'"
"prisoners in disciplinary hearings were rarely provided assistance understanding
the process or a meaningful opportunity to present a defense."'o'
However, the Maine division of the ACLU, in conjunction with corrections
officials and the Maine Prisoner Advocacy Coalition, pushed for reforms as early as
2006.102 Between 2011 and 2012, the Maine DOC transformed its application of
solitary confinement by sending fewer inmates to solitary, reducing the length of
sentences in isolation, improving conditions within the units (e.g., increased access
to reading material and heightened opportunities for social interaction such as
group recreation and counseling), increasing access to care and services in order to
preclude the deterioration of prisoner's mental health, and-most importantly for
due process concerns-communicating a clear track, based on obtainable metrics,
for prisoners to earn their way out of solitary.' 03 As a result, Maine reduced the
population of its solitary confinement by over seventy percent, and in August 23,
2012, there were forty-six prisoners being held in solitary-approximately half the
number of eighteen months prior.104
In terms of correcting due process violations, Maine's State Prison predicated
its restructuring on administrative procedures that arguably violate a prisoner's
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Before the reforms, prisoners in Maine were often
confined to solitary under the guise of "administrative segregation"' 0 -a form of
confinement with loose guidelines-when they were "deemed a risk to the safety of
other inmates or prison staff.""' Maine's use of administrative segregation was
explicitly violative of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. In the event
of a fight, for example, the prison would send both the aggressor and the victim to
solitary confinement while the altercation was considered.' As the ACLU report
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Hearing Statement of the ACLU of Maine] (statement
of the Am. Civil Liberties Union of Me.), available at http://solitarywatch.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/aclu-of-maine-testimony solitary-confinement.pdf.
9 Id.
'o

STUDY

ZACHARY HEIDEN, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ME., CHANGE IS POSSIBLE: A CASE
OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT REFORM
IN MAINE 10 (2013),
available at

https://www.adu.org/files/assets/aclu-solitaryreport-webversion.pdf.
1o1 Id.
102 See ACLU Releases Report on Solitary Confinement Reform in Maine, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
2013),
https://www.adu.org/prisoners-rights/aclu-releases-report-solitary(Mar.
11,
UNION
confinement-reform-maine.
103 HEIDEN, supra note 100, at 13.
104

Id.

Id. at 15.
Kirsten Weir, Alone in the Hole, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., May 2012, at 54, available at
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2012/05/solitary.aspx (defining "administrative segregation").
107 HEIDEN, supra note 100, at 10.
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on Maine's prison system pre-reforms notes: "The timeline for investigation was

vague, and the depth and quality were suspect. A prisoner might spend days,
weeks, or months in [solitary] as a result of being attacked by another prisoner."'o
The text of the prison policy noted that the confinement of a prisoner to
Administrative Segregation was a form of punishment subject to review and was
only to be doled out for limited purposes." 9 But, in practice, the policies were
"ambiguous enough, and the reviews superficial enough, that prisoners had no real
due process protection.""o Ultimately, despite a policy guarantee that prisoners
would be provided with assistance to understand the confinement process and
mount a defense in administrative segregation, these measures were not provided
and the prisoners' due process rights at Maine State Prison were clearly violated in
the absence of "meaningful review."" 0
Post-reforms, administrative segregation at Maine State Prison is only used in
extreme circumstances. Under current Policy 15.01, prisoners are first placed under
emergency observation status in their usual housing environment among the
general prison population."' The prisoners may "only be transferred to [solitary]
upon approval of supervisory staff, and the reasons for the transfer are documented
and reviewed within 72 hours.""' These administrative changes have lead to a more
than fifty percent reduction in the use of solitary confinement at the Maine State
Prison, and that reduction has not been accompanied by an increase in violence
towards guards or other prisoners." 4 Perhaps more importantly, these measures
move away from "mere paper shuffling" us towards providing prisoners with
"meaningful review" of their punishments, thus comporting with the due process
protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. RETHINKING SOLITARY: REFORM UNDER PROPOSED FEDERAL GUIDELINES

In the prison system, the broad application of prolonged solitary confinement is
antithetical to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, recent
state-level systemic reforms, such as those in Mississippi which led to improved
prisoner mental health in the absence of prolonged isolation, and reforms in Maine
aimed at reconfiguring the administrative process of solitary confinement, make it
clear that the institutional inertia that allows for the broad application of solitary
confinement can be overcome, and reforms can be implemented to modify the
practice so that it comports with the Constitution.
10s Id.
'09

"oId.

Id. at 15.

0
"2 See id. at 10-11.
11

2 ME. DEP'T. OF CORR., POLY No. 15.01, ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION STATUS (2002),

availableat http://www.maine.gov/corrections/policies/15.01.pdf.
113 Heiden, supra note 100, at 15.
114 See Hearing Statement of the ACLU of Maine, supra note 102, at 9.
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Congress should draw on the accomplishments of these recent state
restructurings and issue federal reform guidelines that ensure that the practice of
solitary confinement comports with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Specifically, in order to avoid the deprivation of "life's minimum necessities" that
pose a risk of "substantial harm" to the inmate, which the Court has held amount
to "cruel and unusual punishment," the proposed guidelines should be rooted in
three critical objectives: significant limitations on the length of sentencing in
solitary confinement, increased opportunities for social engagement, and
heightened attention paid to mental wellness before, during, and after placement in
isolation.
In an effort to limit the length of sentencing in solitary confinement, federal
guidelines should specify which infractions qualify an inmate for solitary
confinement and should place a two-year cap on continuous isolation.
Furthermore, prison officials should communicate the pre-determined length of an
inmate's confinement to solitary, and provide incentives for positive behavior that
could reduce the prisoner's sentence such as increased privileges, enhanced
education, and job training. Federal guidelines should also require that each
prisoner be given a clear and communicated process for removing himself from
solitary altogether.
In order to maintain optimum mental wellness for inmates in isolation,
conditions of total social isolation and extreme sensory deprivation such as darkness
or severely limited sunlight should be prohibited entirely. Furthermore, inmates
should be given opportunities to engage with each other through social activities
such as group dining or gatherings devoted to certain interest groups. Isolated
inmates should also be given periodic opportunities to participate with the outside
world through communication with family members, access to reading and
education materials, and/or outdoor exercise. These opportunities to engage
outside of their isolation cells would undoubtedly make inmates feel more
connected to each other and to reality, greatly reducing the likelihood that they
devolve into mental instability.
Lastly, each prison institution should be equipped with a medical team that
includes an adequate number of psychiatrists capable of assessing the fitness of each
individual mentally. Mandatory screenings should take place in advance of solitary
confinement. Those prisoners whose psychological and medical conditions would
render them significantly more susceptible to the potentially harmful consequences
of the experience should be precluded from it. Additionally, prison mental health
staff should be required to articulate explicit diagnostic procedures for screening
prisoners who are to be placed in solitary and to specify the diagnostic criteria that
would disqualify prisoners for such confinement. Particularly vulnerable prisoners,
including those with mental illness, should be placed in "missioned housing" that
allows for services targeted to the needs of prisoners. These units provide a smaller
community setting for these vulnerable populations without subjecting them to the
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complete isolation of solitary confinement that could exacerbate their conditions.1 16
Mental health staff should be present and widely available in solitary confinement
units, and should evaluate all prisoners at a minimum of once a month, with
increased frequency according to each individual prisoner's needs. The mental
competence of each prisoner should also be assessed upon release in an effort to
identify which prisoners have been significantly impacted by their isolation and to
ensure that the lingering trauma attached to prolonged confinement is dealt with
sufficiently.
These reforms would serve to move the practice of solitary confinement in line
with the Eighth Amendment by reducing the likelihood of mental deterioration
that amounts to "cruel and unusual punishment" and giving isolated inmates the
opportunity to engage socially, an opportunity that comports with the "minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities."
In terms of due process, the proposed federal guidelines should draw from
Maine's successful state reforms and prescribe policies ensuring that prisoner's
receive meaningful review of the terms of their placement in solitary confinement.
Specifically, no prisoner should be isolated in administrative segregation for longer
than ten days absent or pending a due process hearing to determine disciplinary
segregation status. Furthermore, before placement in solitary confinement,
prisoners should be provided with the evidence that prison officials are using as the
basis for their confinement and each inmate should be given a meaningful
opportunity to respond to the allegations against them and/or appeal the decision
in the presence of a prison administrator and an unbiased prison official.
Furthermore, federal guidelines should mandate that each prison institution
draft a comprehensive (to the extent possible) list of infractions that warrant
placement in solitary confinement, reserving the punishment only for extremely
dangerous and outrageous conduct. The guidelines should also outline protocol for
periodic review of an inmate's status in solitary, and the preferred procedure for
communicating to an inmate the pathway to his or her release from isolation.
Lastly, federal guidelines should ensure that an inmate's placement in solitary does
not in any way limit or prohibit communication with his or her attorney.
These stated reforms provide the minimum measures for "meaningful review"
in an effort to ensure that no prisoner is deprived of his or her right to due process,
and that state and federal prisons are acting in accordance with the Constitution.
In addition to the systemic reforms, Congress should craft federal guidelines
that incentivize state compliance. Representative Cedric Richmond, a staunch
advocate for the overhaul of the practice of solitary confinement, notes that a
mechanism should be built-in to federal guidelines to "ensure that states act to
116 Reassessing Solitary Confinement II: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety
Consequences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 5 (2014) (testimony of Craig DeRoche, President of
Justice Fellowship), available at http://www.justicefellowship.org/content/justice-fellowship-presidentcraig-deroche-testimony-solitary-confinement-prepared-senate (defining "missioned housing" and
offering it as a "promising alternative" to solitary).
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pursue these important reforms.""' Richmond advocates that "[flor each fiscal year,
any money that a state would otherwise receive for prison purposes for that fiscal
year under a grant program shall be reduced by fifteen percent for
non-compliance." However, Richmond notes that "this reduction may be
neutralized if the governor of the state submits to the Attorney General a
certification that the state has adopted and is in full compliance with the national
standards or is on the way to being fully compliant."ns New guidelines would apply
to all federal institutions, while states who chose not to implement new federal
standards would lose 15% of their existing federal grant monies for prison, jail and
youth detention each year if they failed to comply."1
CONCLUSION

Absent more meaningful and informed legal restraints, intervention, and
oversight regarding the practice of solitary confinement, the United States will
remain in noncompliance with the protections afforded by its own Constitution
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This failure undermines the
nation's commitment to democracy and the sanctity of the Constitution. However,
if Congress utilizes recent state reforms to create federal guidelines for the
reformation of solitary confinement and the administrative process surrounding it,
and if Congress incentivizes states to comply with the regulations, meaningful
change can be implemented. Undoubtedly, "inmates must pay their debts to
society, but justice demands that we extract these payments only within the limits
of our Constitution and accepted standards of human decency." 1 20
Prisoners in solitary confinement should not have to confront what Charles
Dickens called "the depth of endurance" in their isolation. Instead, Congress
should endeavor to enact meaningful reform that brings the practices of prison
systems nationwide in line with the Constitution, while reinforcing the rights of
prisoners who are citizens deserving of the same constitutional protections and
privileges afforded to those outside prison walls.
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